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Cross‐Border Corporate Insolvency in the Era of Soft(ish) Law*
© John A. E. Pottow 2015.
Multinational firms follow markets more than national borders. Consequently, the financial distress of
these businesses raises not just complex questions of jurisdictional doctrine but of corporate bankruptcy
policy more generally. Scholars, policymakers, and judges alike all continue to struggle with how most
efficiently and fairly to resolve these “cross‐border” or “transnational” insolvencies. It is fascinating area
of corporate insolvency law because it is in such flux. This moving target has led to a paradoxical role for
corporate bankruptcy scholars. On the one hand, because of the novelty of each new case that raises
international concerns, academic work, even the deeply theoretical, has enjoyed considerably more at‐
tention than its traditional cobweb level of engagement in the domestic arena (hope you are enjoying
this book!).1 On the other hand, because international law involves international diplomacy and reveals
the influence of other extra‐legal and peri‐legal considerations, what one might euphemistically call
more “pragmatic” concerns frequently carry the day.2 Thus, the purest academic theories are often ig‐
nored in this most unprincipled but necessary world, making scholarly relevance all the more challen‐
ning.
This chapter introduces the reader to the messy world of cross‐border corporate insolvency. While it is
mindful of the overarching goal many advocate (its author included) of reducing the cost of credit as a
worthy foundation of corporate insolvency law,3 it cautions at the outset that a pragmatic, at times
atheoretical sensibility guides this field.4 This messiness stems in large part from the fractured (and frac‐
tious) nature of bankruptcy. Different nations have not just different bankruptcy laws but different con‐
ceptions about the desirability of unifying cross‐border law. This divide has stymied historical efforts to

1

*I appreciate the seemingly endless research assistance from James Thurman, Michigan J.D. Class of
2015, whose work on this article transcended his graduation.
1
For example, the concept of “synthetic secondary proceedings,” arising from my work and that of Ted
Janger, found its way into the EU’s recent amendments to its landmark Insolvency Regulation. See Regulation 2015/848, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings, art. 36, 2015 O.J. (L 141) (EU), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015R0848&from=EN [hereinafter EU Insolvency Regulation].
See generally John A. E. Pottow, A New Role for Secondary Proceedings in International Bankruptcies,
46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 579 (2011); Edward J. Janger, Virtual Territoriality, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 401
(2010).
2
See Bob Wessels & Ian Fletcher, Int’l Insolvency Inst., GLOBAL PRINCIPLES FOR COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES 151 (2010) (noting the pitfalls of compromise by saying ‘the best
should not be allowed to become the enemy of the good’).
3
Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177,
2181 (1999).
4
For example, in amending its Insolvency Regulation, the E.U. championed the theory of universalism
but bemoaned the necessary concessions to praxis: “This Regulation acknowledges the fact that as a result
of widely differing substantive laws, it is not practical to introduce insolvency proceedings with universal
scope throughout the Union.” EU INSOLVENCY REGULATION, supra note 1, at 22nd Recital.
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craft international treaties related to bankruptcy.5 Until recently, there wasn’t even that much cross‐
border bankruptcy “law.” After centuries of mistrust, however, international bankruptcy reached a con‐
ceptual breakthrough just within the last two decades. The lynchpin to this success was the abandon‐
ment of conventional international law (conventions) and the rise of “soft law” instruments, such as,
principally, UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency.6 UNCITRAL’s Model Law (and the cog‐
nate EU Insolvency Regulation)7 not only radically altered the international bankruptcy landscape but
has now set the stage for what is going to be the next wave of reform that is presently unfolding. And it
is this soft law status that gets all the credit.
This chapter will proceed as follows. First, it will introduce the reader to the academic theories dominat‐
ing transnational bankruptcy law in order to set the stage for the explication of the Model Law. Next, it
will explore the Model Law and show how its soft status enabled its embrace by multiple jurisdictions
around the globe. Third, it will examine some of the important case law that has emerged under the
Model Law with an eye to gauging the success of the instrument. Finally, it will critique the new pro‐
posals emerging as the “next wave” of international insolvency reform to see how they fit within the
soft law approach and underlying academic theories.
I.

CROSS‐BORDER INSOLVENCY THEORY.

For better or worse, scholarship in the transnational corporate insolvency arena has shifted to “second‐
order” considerations (or, in some instances, “third‐order” considerations).8 So, too, has law‐making.
But because first‐order consideration should anchor an analysis of second‐order arguments, we should
start, dear reader, by examining the dominant normative theories over the design of an optimal cross‐
border insolvency regime. Then we can relax the assumptions of theoretical purity for greater reality.
One of the canonical theoretical conceptions of corporate insolvency is collective‐action based.9 This
widely accepted view imposes a “statist” solution to financial distress through reorganization or liquida‐
tion. “Statist” intends to convey the idea that a compulsory, public process is deployed as a concession
to the likely impossibility of ad hoc contractual solutions that the parties would hypothetically prefer to
remedy these collective action concerns but cannot achieve on their own. Hence, the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code has an automatic stay and a bankruptcy judge blocking the atomistic conduct of self‐interested
5

See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and
Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 487 (1991) (discussing the Strasbourg Convention and the
failed Brussels Convention); Todd Kraft & Allison Aranson, Transnational Bankruptcies: Section 304
and Beyond, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 329 (1993) (discussing the challenges facing adoption of the
International Bar Association’s largely ignored Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act).
6
See U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO
ENACTMENT, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3, art. 25 (1999) [hereinafter MODEL LAW].
7
See EU INSOLVENCY REGULATION, supra note 1.
8
See e.g., John A. E. Pottow, Beyond Carve-Outs and Toward Reliance: A Normative Framework for
Cross-Border Insolvency Choice of Law, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 197, 197-199 (2014).
9
See Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 158-60 (1989).
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creditors.10 The statist solution enhances welfare by preserving value (especially going concern value),
with the concomitant attribute of lowering credit costs. Higher insolvency‐state distribution should
translate to lower aggregate credit costs.11 (“Aggregate” because an efficient individual collector know‐
ing it could reap the fruits of its rapaciousness might not like the forced pari passu collectivism in the
statist approach of cross‐subsidizing its less efficient brethren, but including all the uncertain, risk‐
averse, and/or lemon‐concerned creditors makes the aggregate claim plausible.) The necessary founda‐
tion of the statist approach, therefore, by literal definition, is a state, replete with the sovereign’s law‐
making and law‐enforcing power.12
In the international realm there is no state and hence no possible statist solution. This demoralizes the
credit‐cost‐minimizing theoretician, who bemoans this lack of law. Of course, binding international law
can be made by sovereign consent through treaty execution. Yet corporate insolvency—all insolvency—
has until recently by international law standards remained stubbornly resistant to treaty enactment.
Why is this so? Wise scholars have suggested that the challenge is due both to the invasive and to the
normatively contested nature of bankruptcy law.13 Consider invasive. Bankruptcy law is what might be
considered “trans‐substantive” because it overlaps and displaces other discrete domains of substantive
law. For example, one can consider the law of patents as prescribing a set of rules governing certain
intellectual property rights. But bankruptcy law dangles an asterisk over that field, cautioning that all
bets might be off when a corporate debtor seeks relief from creditors.14 Almost no area of substantive
law is immune from trumping in bankruptcy, both vertically in a federal system and horizontally in terms
of pre‐emption of sister regulatory regimes.15 In the United States, the pages of the bankruptcy report‐
ers are flush with enraged lawyers for the IRS, EPA, and NLRB, not to mention scores of states attorneys
general, who are routinely on the losing end of a scope question of bankruptcy law.16 (The automatic
stay shunting those lawyers into oft‐unfamiliar bankruptcy courts to make their losing claims rubs salt in
10

11 U.S.C. § 541.
See Alan Schwartz, A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy, 91 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1201-04
(2005).
12
See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795, 855 (“A
bankruptcy regime exists to enforce a set of priorities chosen by legislators.”); see also Barry E. Adler,
Bankruptcy Primitives (discussing state’s role in dictating distributional endowments in bankruptcy).
13
See, e.g., John A. E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy, 45
VA. J. INT’L L. 935, 942 (2005).
14
See, e.g., In re Telegroup, Inc., 237 B.R. 87 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1999) (denying patent holder relief from
stay to sue debtor for alleged post-petition patent infringement).
15
See, e.g., 40235 Washington St. Corp. v. Lusardi, 329 F.3d 1076, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
conflict preemption precluded application of California statute governing validity of tax deeds because
the statute conflicted with the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code); Walls v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 510-511 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that remedies for violation of discharge injunction under 11 U.S.C. §524 precluded claims under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act).
Criminal law probably fares best against bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1).
16
See, e.g., In re Bristol Convalescent Home, Inc., 12 B.R. 448, 450 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (holding
that, contrary to the IRS’s insistence, money owed to the debtor which the IRS had levied upon was in
fact property of the debtor’s estate and therefore subject to turnover under § 542).
11
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the wound.) Thus, one reason treaties are difficult—with their inherent cession of sovereignty—is that
bankruptcy law can have wide‐sweeping and deep‐reaching effect.17
The second reason is that bankruptcy laws have thick normative content. For example, consider the pri‐
ority provisions.18 Yes, priority rules can be dismissed as the spoils of domestic rent‐seeking contests
(and they often are), but they also do represent deeply held policy beliefs on the sensitive distributional
choices that arise in financial failure. Take, for example, the security‐trumping labor claim priorities of
many domestic insolvency regimes.19 Having to yield on those matters by treaty to a foreign country’s
laws is not an easy sell. It is no surprise that bankruptcy for a long time eluded international lawmaking.
Cognizant of these constraints, international bankruptcy scholars divided into opposing camps for two
theoretical models of the optimal cross‐border insolvency law. The first, universalists, took a “one law”
approach and argued that both the principles of cost minimization and the fairness‐animated justifica‐
tion for pari passu distribution militated in favor of one substantive bankruptcy law to govern a multina‐
tional’s financial assets, regardless of their jurisdictional location.20 Cost minimization would obtain,
they argued, via at least three avenues: (a) reduction in monitoring costs, where creditors would not
have to follow a debtor’s assets as they crossed national borders to see which new substantive bank‐
ruptcy consequences would result, (b) reduction in fragmentation costs, as creditors would not have to
open duplicative and wasteful proceedings in each jurisdiction that contained assets of the debtor, and
(c) going‐concern preservation, with one binding law able to prevent the destructive, territoriality‐based
liquidation of an enterprise whose going‐concern value required coordinated utilization of assets in mul‐
tiple countries (mimicking the statist approach).21 Undergirding the universalists’ cost‐minimization ar‐
guments were also robust fairness concerns: that the recovery of a creditor should not depend upon the
random happenstance of asset location on the day of bankruptcy. If a debtor happened to have a boun‐
ty of assets in Country X and a paucity in Countries Y and Z, then the X creditors should not have a wind‐
fall when the going‐concern value is spread evenly over the three jurisdictions.22
Universalists (perhaps ironically) do not command universal support. Territorialists, as their name im‐
plies, oppose what they see as universalist pipe‐dreaming on both cost‐minimization arguments and

17

See Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 31, 45-48 (2001).
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507.
19
See Andrew Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177,
2196-98 (2000) (noting that although all regimes surveyed gave priority status to employee claimants, the
status and amount of those claims varied country to country).
20
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276, 228485 (2000).
21
See Guzman, supra note 19, at 2199-04.
22
See Westbrook, supra note 20, at 2309. Indeed, pari passu distribution (tempered by voluntary contractual priority rearrangement) is likely the outcome of an approach focused on capital cost minimization,
because, unless the parties have an affirmative reason to deviate from a ratable return, the avoidance of
priority conflict and its attendant cost is a savings.
18
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their own fairness grounds.23 On the cost front, they complain that whatever monitoring costs univer‐
salism saves might well be offset by non‐diversification and forum‐shopping costs. That is, because uni‐
versalism puts all the distributional eggs in one nation’s basket by global application of that one nation’s
bankruptcy laws, favored creditors will jockey to have their nation be the selected hegemon, just as jilt‐
ed creditors will litigate vociferous opposition to bowing to that nation’s rules. Forum shopping will fol‐
low as a matter of course, racing to the bottom or top (depending on one’s views) as fast as the much‐
analyzed corporate charters are drafted at U.S. state law. As such, no stable rule will ever evolve to se‐
lect the “winning” jurisdiction, as perceived losers will either not acquiesce ex ante or will undermine ex
post.24 As for fragmentation costs, absent a pan‐global adjudication system of cross‐border bankruptcy
tribunals, enforcement would fall to local courts, in which case multiple proceedings would have to be
opened anyway, just with different substantive laws.25 Finally, regarding the destruction of going‐
concern value, territorialists retort that nothing prevents creditors in divers jurisdictions from cooperat‐
ing ad hoc when to do so would be in the collective benefit. 26
But even more than the cost arguments, deeply held beliefs of sovereignty and vested rights exercise
the territorialists. Territorialists complain that creditors (more specifically, local creditors) lend to a
debtor on the expectation that they have certain rights under local insolvency law. To pull the rug out
from under them and apply a foreign bankruptcy law—because their debtor is a multinational—runs
roughshod over these expectations.27 Worse, because of the normative content of bankruptcy law dis‐
cussed above, application of this foreign law requires subjugation of the careful domestic policy balance
of insolvency priorities in favor of some foreign jurisdiction’s tastes. No country would—or should—
accept this emasculation.28 As such, territorialists contend, good borders make good neighbors, and
allowing each nation to govern the adjudication of assets within its jurisdiction in the event of a multina‐
tional’s bankruptcy is the best way to address general financial default.
23

Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 2216, 2239-42 (2000).
24
See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE
BANKRUPTCY COURTS 217-21 (2006); Lynn M. LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J.
143, 143-44 (2005).
25
See Janger, supra note 1, at 409.
26
See LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 24, at 143-44. This argument ignores the collective
action concerns animating the creditor’s bargain theory of a statist solution, but such critique is beyond
the scope of this discussion.
27
See, e.g., Council Regulation 1346/2000, arts. 27-28. Here, the Council of the European Union empowered local creditors to initiate secondary proceedings in their home countries to enjoy the benefit of local
bankruptcy law. The Council also cited “the protection of local interests” as a justification for secondary
proceedings. Id. at 19th Recital.
28
Professor Rasmussen has offered a third approach, “contractualism,” which leaves the choice of law
decision to the debtor, allowing corporate entities to select the regime to govern their insolvency proceeding in their corporate charters, but this contribution is beyond the scope of our present focus. See Robert
K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2252,
2254 (2000).
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It is fair to say that as an academic matter, the universalists have won the upper hand in terms of fol‐
lowers.29 But the burden is on them, so to speak, because the dictates of sovereignty are that absent
international agreement, territorialism is the status quo. The universalism‐territorialism debate has
been well ventilated academically, and so the reader of this chapter will have to join its author’s theo‐
retical stipulation that universalists have the better theoretical argument, especially when viewed
through the lens of corporate insolvency law’s interest in minimizing the ex ante cost of credit.
II.

THE RISE OF SOFT LAW (AND, CONSEQUENTLY, UNIVERSALISM).

As alluded to above, recurrent attempts to execute an international convention on insolvency law have
failed, which is not surprising given the hotly contested differences of universalists and territorialists.
(Different countries map to different proclivities; the United States is a leading universalist jurisdiction,
whereas Japan, although now improving, was widely known for its territorialism.)30 A couple historical
developments—perhaps aided by the backdrop of ever‐increasing globalization of business—broke the
historical logjam on international bankruptcy cooperation. Likely inspired by the landmark restructuring
of Maxwell Communications,31 a global publishing conglomerate, and certainly facilitated by the unfold‐
ing institutional apparatus of the European Union, the 1990s saw the drafting of a European Insolvency
Regulation and concomitant Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency promulgated by UNCITRAL. It is not
overstatement to say these were watershed innovations in cross‐border insolvency that brought the
first real semblance of coherence to the international bankruptcy scene. Because the EU has sover‐
eignesque authority to bind member states directly to Directives and Regulations, its task (as a positive
law matter, not necessarily as a political matter) was somewhat easier than UNCITRAL’s.32 Relatedly,
the binding consequence of the EU Regulation is stronger than the UNCITRAL Model Law. Both regimes,
however, advanced the agenda of universalism.
A. Introduction to the UNCITRAL Model Law.
Although these two instruments developed in tandem, for ease of exposition we will focus on the Model
Law championed by UNCITRAL. This document’s success was principally due to its soft status and depar‐
ture from the traditional international document of the multi‐state convention (treaty).33 Here, “soft” is
used as a term of art, and the reader is spared the voluminous literature on the constitution of soft
29

Pottow, supra note 8, at 947; see generally Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible, 23
MICH. J. INT’L L. 31 (2001); Guzman, supra note 19; Westbrook, supra note 20.
30
Samuel L. Bufford & Kazuhiro Yanagida, Japan’s Revised Laws on Business Reorganization: An
Analysis, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 55 (2006).
31
In re Maxwell Commc’n. Corp., 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
32
The EU is not, strictly speaking, a sovereign entity because EU member states retain the power to opt
out of EU regulations. Still, the Insolvency Regulation was adopted by all member states other than
Denmark. See Westbrook, supra note 20, at 2280. Though beyond the scope of this chapter, it is notable
that the Insolvency Regulation began as a convention but later took the form of a regulation due to the
United Kingdom’s sensitivity over mad cow disease. See E. Bruce Leonard, The International Scene, The
International Year in Review, 2001 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34, 34 (2001).
33
Pottow, supra note 13, at 985-88.
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law.34 Relevant for purposes of this chapter is a working definition of soft law that means not only non‐
binding compulsion (the absence of legislation), an essential attribute of soft law, but a further, substan‐
tive dimension. Perhaps more accurately characterized as “incomplete” or “unspecified” law, the con‐
tent of the Model Law, wholly apart from (actually, intrinsically related to) its non‐binding nature, is no‐
table for its careful failure to engage the most contentious substantive legal bankruptcy issues. It is thus
both “positively” and “substantively” soft, which will be how “soft” law is used in this discussion.
Thus, UNCITRAL’s Model Law sought to blunt the opposition of the two fervent camps of universalists
and territorialists by carving a non‐committal fine line down the middle to secure maximal buy‐in. That
is, the Model Law nominally purports to address matters of bankruptcy procedure (opening and recogni‐
tion of proceedings, etc.) without comprehensively resolving the difficult distributional questions at‐
tendant with choice of bankruptcy law raised by the universalist‐territorialist divide.35 This might be
considered its substantive softness, as opposed to its positivist softness, mentioned above. Some if not
most commentators assessed this aspect of the Model Law (perhaps decried it) as milquetoast reform at
best that did not advance the field significantly.36 Others have taken a more nuanced view. For them,
the Model Law was not pussyfooting but intentionally reticent.37 And in being so, the Model Law ex‐
ploited its soft law nature to advance the cause of universalism considerably and should thus be cele‐
brated, not bemoaned, by bankruptcy scholars seeking to minimize the cost of credit.
How does a self‐described (and other‐described) middle‐ground instrument that eschews the universal‐
ism‐territorialism theoretical minefield manage to advance the cause of universalism? This chapter will

34

See, e.g., Andrew Guzman & Timothy Meyer, Soft Law, in THE RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECO(Eugene . Kontorovich & Francesco Parisi eds. 2016).
35
The Enactment Guide states that the Model Law’s “scope [is] limited to some procedural aspects of
cross-border insolvency cases.” Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, ¶. 8, reprinted in 6 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 415 (1998). Additionally, commentators have
noted that the Model Law does not even use the words “territorialism” or “universalism.” See Pottow,
supra note 13, at 961 n. 106.
36
See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Rethinking International Insolvency: The Neglected Role of Choice-ofLaw Rules and Theory, 36 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 23, 35-36 (2000) (“Thus, in explicitly recognizing and deferring to a court’s ability to implement a territorial approach, the [Model Law] not only falls short of its
promise of universality but also gives new vitality to territoriality.”); Liza Perkins, Note, A Defense of
Pure Universalism in Cross-Border Corporate Insolvencies, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 787, 828
(2000) (“[The Model Law] do[es] not go far enough. In fact, the UNCITRAL Model Law, even if widely
enacted, may do little to change the dreadful state of affairs in international bankruptcy law.”); see also
Ian F. Fletcher, The European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: Choice-of-Law Provisions, 33
TEX. INT’L. L.J. 119, 124 (1998) (acknowledging that compromise approaches “draw the wrathful ire of
purists”).
37
See Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Incrementalisms in Global Lawmaking, 32 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 851, 853-854 (2007) (citing the Model Law as an instance of incremental lawmaking where “beneath the surface, the Model Law actually advanced universalism, and in a way that caused minimal affront to territorialism”) (quoting Pottow, supra note 13, at 939).
NOMICS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
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not summarize the Model Law in all its glory and leaves interested readers referred elsewhere.38 But it
will highlight two broad ways in which the Model Law advances the universalism cause notwithstanding
its middle‐road substantive softness. First, the instrument does so mechanically. Specifically, the Model
Law contains important procedurally focused grants of authority that allow enacting jurisdictions to co‐
operate, coordinate, and communicate with sister jurisdictions jointly seized with the administration of
a cross‐border corporate bankruptcy. For example, many countries have constraints on the abilities of
their courts to contact foreign tribunals (think letters rogatory and other such barnacles), and so the
Model Law makes clear that to the extent not incompatible with their local domestic due process norms,
these courts can and even should reach out and to a certain extent “co‐adjudicate” with foreign peers
bankruptcy questions.39 In a similar vein, Article 8 of the Model Law (codified as section 1508 in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code) instructs domestic courts to consider foreign law in rendering their decisions under
the instrument, commanding that “regard is to be had to its international origin and to the need to
promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith.”40
B. The Model Law’s Universalism: Doctrinal Anchors but “Substantive” Softness.
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, beyond these cooperation‐facilitating mechanical rules,
the Model Law helps erect the doctrinal foundations for a universalist system. That is, for a pluralist
universalist system to function, two conceptual pillars must be established. First, a jurisdiction‐selecting
rule must be propounded to designate the substantive bankruptcy law that will control the one,
“universal” rules of priority, distribution, and the like that will transcend national borders.41 Second,
there must be what universalism’s chief proponent calls “an acceptance of outcome differences,” mean‐
ing deferring or ancillary states must be willing to subordinate their own (normatively rich) distributional
rules for the greater good of system efficiency.42 The Model Law (just as the EU Insolvency Regulation)
advances both of these constructs.
As broad overview, the general structure of the Model Law envisions a domestic court considering a re‐
quest for assistance from a foreign bankruptcy proceeding representative. For example, a British bank‐
ruptcy administrator may open a proceeding in Australian court to seek turnover of Australian‐situated
assets for purposes of transferring them to the U.K. proceeding for liquidation there. Or a Canadian or‐
der confirming a corporate reorganization proceeding under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act
may be brought down to U.S. court for enforcement to enjoin American creditors to comport with the
plan. Thus, the Model Law is generally directed at “receiving” courts: it delineates the scope of coopera‐

38

See Andre J. Berends, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A Comprehensive
Overview, 6 TUL. INT’L & COMP. L. 309 (1998).
39
See MODEL LAW, supra note 6, art. 25. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code mirrors the language of the Model
Law. 11 U.S.C. § 1525.
40
MODEL LAW, art. 8; accord 11 U.S.C. § 1508.
41
Pottow, supra note 13, at 952.
42
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice
of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 458 (1991).
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tion and deference they should accord “requesting” courts in a multi‐jurisdiction insolvency.43 Against
this backdrop, the Model Law reveals two universalist‐leaning attributes.
First, the Model Law doctrinally deploys a jurisdiction‐selecting rule. That rule is the Centre of Main In‐
terests (“COMI,” as it is now called around the world, itself a worthy sidebar discussion of legal nomen‐
clature).44 Several legal concepts coalesce (“principal place of business” in U.S. parlance, “real seat”
from the French, etc.) to confirm that the jurisdiction with the greatest connection to the corporate
debtor will be accorded the most control under the Model Law system in receiving assistance.45 More
specifically, the Model Law designates an insolvency proceeding afoot in the corporate debtor’s COMI as
a “foreign main proceeding,” and contrasts it with other proceedings not so situated (and for the most
part designated “foreign non‐main proceedings”).46 While the Model Law requires enacting jurisdictions
to recognize requests for assistance from foreign bankruptcy representatives coming from abroad to lay
claim to domestic assets, the assistance granted to those shepherding foreign main proceedings is
greater. Specifically, the domestic courts enter an automatic stay upon such a request from a foreign
main proceeding.47 While they can also stay domestic collection actions at the request of a foreign non‐
main proceeding’s insolvency representative, that relief is purely at the discretion of the local court.48
Thus, in according (at least some) automatic relief to a foreign main proceeding, the Model Law seeks to
enshrine one court—the COMI—with greater legal authority over all others. This essence of “jurisdic‐
tional hierarchy” thereby erects this first pillar of universalism: selection of a dominant forum worthy of
legal deference.49
The second universalism‐fomenting feature is somewhat touchier. For a completely universalist system
to get off the ground, the deferring or ancillary states have to be willing to suppress their home‐state

43

See generally MODEL LAW, supra note 6, arts. 25-27; 11 U.S.C. §§ 1525-15.
See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 713, 719-20 (2005); MODEL
LAW, supra note 6, art. 17(2)(a); 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4).
45
See Miguel Virgos & Etienne Schmit, Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, Art. 16148, 6500/96 (1996) (“Since the main proceedings can be opened only if the debtor has his centre of main
interests in the State of the opening . . . the decision of the law of that state . . . should be respected by the
other Member States, whose connection with the debtor is restricted to the existence of an establishment
or assets.”).
46
See MODEL LAW, supra note 6, art. 2(b)-2(c); 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4)-(5). “Main” and “non-main” do not
exhaust the universe of cross-border insolvency proceedings. There is a third class of proceedings for
debtors that do not meet the “establishment’ requirement for a non-main proceeding. These oddities are
beyond the scope of this enquiry. See Pottow, supra note 1, at 581.
47
See MODEL LAW, supra note 6, art. 20 § 1(a)-(b); 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(1).
48
See MODEL LAW, art. 21(1)(a), (b), and (c); 11 U.S.C. § 1521 (a), (b) and (c).
49
See Pottow, supra note 1, at 583 (defining “jurisdictional hierarchies” as systems “designed to subordinate the secondary proceeding and make them, aptly, secondary”). The selection of forum is not set in
stone; the presumption of COMI is rebutted when the incorporation location is merely a sham, which
serves as a proxy for forum shopping. See John A. E. Pottow, Forum Shopping in Transnational Insolvency, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 785, 793 (2007).
44
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insolvency rules in favor of the COMI court’s, a tough sell to the sovereignty‐conscious.50 This the Model
Law (by design) does not do. A full analysis of the Model Law’s capacity nonetheless to acclimate ancil‐
lary states to the imposition of COMI bankruptcy law is beyond the scope of this discussion. (The mech‐
anisms are subtle and the subject of other work to which the interested reader is referred.)51 A broad
generalization can be made that suffices for purposes of this discussion: the Model Law facilitates that
application of COMI state law by offering its potential application in a non‐threatening (i.e., “soft”) man‐
ner. What the Model Law does is suggest a framework, perhaps even a presumption, of that deference
to COMI bankruptcy law, but then claw back that seemingly universalist proclivity with unambiguous
territorialist retrenchments.52 This is where we see pragmatism creeping its way into the theoretical
purity of cross‐border insolvency law. Specifically, the Model Law approach does not force wholesale
“export” of the COMI state’s bankruptcy laws to the ancillary jurisdictions as universalism would coun‐
sel. Rather, it permits, but for the most part does not require, its exportation. That is, while true the
Model Law contains a jurisdictional hierarchy favoring the COMI state, it still leaves cooperation up to
the cooperating states.53 Some have called this “modified universalism,” because the injection of discre‐
tion diminishes the universalist application of one substantive bankruptcy law.54 It “modifies” (better,
“softens”) universalism’s unitary aspect by allowing some territorial concessions. This modification was
likely necessary to get the law past territorialist states who would otherwise have balked at the cession
of sovereignty from more full‐throated universalism.55
The Model Law’s balancing act is careful and delicate. That is, on the one hand it offers modified univer‐
salism and the ability of a foreign representative to take assets away from a local jurisdiction and deploy
them under foreign distributional rules.56 On the other hand, it qualifies those seemingly universalists
powers by three important concessions to territorialists (wholly apart from the baseline discretionary
power to cooperate with the request for assistance). Namely, the Model Law contains three principal
“claw‐backs” toward territorialism from its universalist inroads. First, although the recognition provi‐
sions accord relatively automated and mandated cooperation to the foreign insolvency representative
(the local courts are commanded to “recognize” the foreign representative if a check list of factors is
satisfied, and moreover to specify whether they are recognizing a foreign main or non‐main proceed‐
50

See Tung, supra note 17, at 55 (“[A] state’s preference for its own bankruptcy law and reluctance to
recognize foreign bankruptcy proceedings may arise from the desire of domestic actors to defend the policies implicit in their domestic laws.”).
51
See Pottow, supra note 13, at 980-96 (discussing, among other things, notice provisions and the presumption of insolvency).
52
See id. at 969 (“[T]he Model Law, on the surface, appears to be a hybrid of sorts: partially universalist
in outreach, but partially territorialist in retrenchment.”).
53
See MODEL LAW, supra note 6, arts. 25-26; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1525-1527.
54
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Bankruptcy Tourism, 3 Int’l J. of Proc. L. 159, 161-62 (2013).
55
See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, The ALI
Principles, and the EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 Am. Bankr. L. J. 1, 17 (2002) (noting that Articles 28
and 29, which allow local proceedings to trump foreign proceedings under certain circumstances, were
sine qua non of passing the Model Law).
56
See, e.g., MODEL LAW, supra note 6, art. 21(1)(e); 11 U.S.C. § 1521(a)-(b).
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ing),57 the relief provisions are separated out for different treatment. Bluntly, recognition does not
mean relief. Once recognized, the foreign insolvency representative must still ask the local court for
specific bankruptcy‐related relief. While some relief is awarded automatically (e.g., the stay to a foreign
main proceeding), most relief is discretionary.58 The Model Law grafts three constraints onto the exer‐
cise of that discretion.
Consider the most poignant of all relief requests: expatriation of local assets to the foreign main pro‐
ceeding, which the Model Law explicitly countenances.59 This is the essence of universalism. The Model
Law envisions a domestic court ordering turnover of locally situated assets to the COMI court to share
with COMI creditors and distribute under the substantive rules of COMI bankruptcy law. Local creditors
are unlikely to welcome the departure of such assets that would otherwise be available to satisfy local
claims. This is especially so for local creditors who are protected by local priority rules, such as, e.g., U.S.
fishermen under the U.S. Code.60
Recognizing this territorialist tension working against its quintessentially universalist provision for dis‐
cretionary relief, the Model Law spells out safeguard considerations that must be undertaken by a local
court before assets can be turned over to the COMI tribunal.61 One of those expressly states that the
interests of local creditors must be “adequately protected.”62 To be sure, the Model Law intentionally
and delphically leaves this standard undefined, but the idea is surely to offer the aggrieved local creditor
ammunition to deny turnover and loss of domestic bankruptcy favoritism. Indeed, an overly robust
form of interpreting “adequate protection” would deny any turnover unless the local creditors would
receive at a minimum their precise entitlement under local law (a standard auguring poorly for the ac‐
ceptance of outcome differences necessary to buttress universalism),63 but courts have for the most
part not fallen into this trap.64 Rather, the idea has been interpreted to allow something of a “margin of
57

See id., supra note 6, art. 17(1)-(2); 11 U.S.C. § 1517.
The automatic stay for foreign main proceedings arises from Article 20(1)(a), while discretionary interim relief, post-recognition relief, and relief under laws of the enacting state arise from articles 19, 21, and
7, respectively.
59
See MODEL LAW, supra note 6, art. 21.1(e)-21.2.
60
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6) (2012).
61
MODEL LAW, supra note 6, art. 22(1)-(2). The discretionary nature of the relief is not on its own
enough to assuage territorially inclined states. This is because of agency costs and the possibility of renegade judges. The mere possibility that the Model Law could allow a judge to “go wild” would terrify policymakers from these states, and so the specific provisions built into the Model Law were necessary for
their assuagance wholly apart from the discretionary nature of many of the relief provisions.
62
See MODEL LAW, supra note 6, art. 21, ¶2; 15 U.S.C. § 1522(a). Note, this “adequate protection” is not
coextensive with the safeguard for secured creditors under U.S. bankruptcy law. Congress used the term
“sufficiently protected” here to avoid confusion. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), 115 (2005).
63
See LoPucki, supra note 23, at 2221 (2000) (arguing that modified universalism is virtually indistinguishable from territorialism if cooperation with foreign courts hinges on the rights of the parties under
local law not being altered).
64
Some have. The recent U.K. case of Cosco Bulk Carrier Co Ltd v. Armada Shipping SA, [2011]
EWHC 216 (Ch), 2011 WL 398130, casts some worry that even respected courts may fall victim to ex58
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appreciation,”65 and thus a loose recognition of “adequate protection” has been seen that requires only
general respect of entitlements or assets without assuring perfect concordance.66 A survey of the case
law is beyond the scope of this analysis (although a flavor can be divined from the public policy cases
discussed below). Still, however “strictly” or “loosely” the standard is interpreted, the point remains
that the local creditor safeguard of adequate protection is a significant retrenchment toward territorial‐
ism contained within the universalist‐inclined Model Law.
The second significant territorialist concession of the Model Law—whose inclusion was likely a sine qua
non for hesitant states to join—was the supremacy of local bankruptcy proceedings. Recall that the ar‐
chetypal Model Law application is to an ancillary proceeding lending assistance to a foreign main pro‐
ceeding. But nothing in the Model Law precludes (indeed, specific provisions explicitly affirm) the ability
of uncooperatively inclined local creditors to open a full “plenary” proceeding (for example, in the Unit‐
ed States, a chapter 11 reorganization)67 under local law to govern local assets.68 There, the world shifts
back to the pre‐Model‐Law, comity‐dependent State of Insolvency Nature, with courts negotiating ad
hoc for cooperation, complete with the prospect of dueling and conflicting court orders.69 Although
there are provisions that blunt the territorialist consequences of such a local creditor veto,70 the fact
remains that a territorially inclined creditor can drop the opt‐out bomb at any time and have local law
reign supreme.

pansive insistence of foreign concordance with local law and even evince hostility to foreign procedures.
The Cosco court held that a London arbitration between a Swiss debtor in a recognized foreign main proceeding from Switzerland and a British shipping company should continue over the foreign representative’s objection and request for a stay. Referring to his discretion under the Model Law, the judge relied
on the fact that the dispute would be governed by English shipping law and that London arbitrators would
be more qualified. The court discounted the expense and delay of the arbitration, complaining that “the
only reason why that has not occurred is because of the [foreign representative’s] preference for some
other, probably Swiss, method of dispute resolution.” Id. at ¶¶ 52-60.
65
While there is no canonical definition of “margin of appreciation,” the term generally refers to the latitude given to member states in observing conventions, initially applied to the European Convention on
Human Rights. The term did not appear in the text of the Convention, but was first used in the Cyprus
Case. See Greece v. the United Kingdom (The Cyprus Case) (1958-59) 2 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 172
(1958-59) (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.).
66
See, e.g., In re Schimmelpenninck, 183 F.3d 347, 364 (5th Cir. 1999); In re Sivec SRL, 476 B.R. 310,
324 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 2012); In re Petition of Garcia Avila, 296 B.R. 95, 112 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
67
The lax bankruptcy jurisdictional rules in the United States make this an easy prospect, even if the
debtor’s COMI is located elsewhere.
68
See MODEL LAW, supra note 6, art. 28; 11 U.S.C. § 1528.
69
See, e.g., Stonington Partners, Inc. v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Prod. N.V., 310 F.3d 118, 122 (3d
Cir. 2002).
70
For example, the parallel domestic plenary proceeding is restricted to assets within that country’s territorial jurisdiction. See MODEL LAW, supra note 6,art. 28; 11 U.S.C. § 1528. The Model Law thus cabins
worldwide bankruptcy jurisdictional pretensions, such as found in the U.S. Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 541
(incorporating definition of “property of the estate” to include all property “wherever located and by
whomever held”).
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The third concession to territorial sovereignty is the least surprising because it replicates the “escape
clause” found in many international instruments involving recognition of foreign judgments and choice
of foreign law.71 It provides that the cooperating court may always refuse to grant relief—even purport‐
edly automatic relief—if to do so would violate “fundamental public policy” of the recognizing jurisdic‐
tion.72 This assuages the “little states” that they will not be hegemonically commandeered by the possi‐
bly offensive bankruptcy laws of the COMI jurisdiction. With these three carveouts/clawbacks toward
territorialism, the Model Law was able to advance a “proto‐universalist” policy of a COMI‐centered re‐
gime that defers, in some limited respects, to COMI‐state bankruptcy laws but that backtracks in im‐
portant ways from that promise. This middle‐ground stance of the Model Law—at best a soft nudge
toward universalism—was instrumental to its passage. A more brazen attempt toward universalism
would likely have faltered given the sovereignty‐consciousness of many states.73
C. The Model Law’s “Traditional” Softness (It’s Not Law!)
Equally important to the passage of the Model Law as substantive softness, namely, its delicate middle‐
ground posture between universalism and territorialism (although leaning clearly universalist), was as a
positivist matter its mode of implementation, namely, as a model law. While prior attempts at interna‐
tional agreement through the treaty mechanism tried and failed—repeatedly and spectacularly—the
model law document allowed ultimate say on whether and how to enact the legislation up to each indi‐
vidual state, piecemeal and on its own timeframe.74 Model laws are thus soft laws. More precisely, they
might be called “softish,” because of course if and when the law becomes implemented as domestic leg‐
islation it crystallizes into hard law. As mentioned, this softness of the Model Law was another neces‐
sary condition to its acceptability by deeply hesitant and skeptical states.
But there are degrees of softness, and the Model Law, while soft, is far from the soft end of the spec‐
trum. While soft enough to win over doubting states, it still tilts hard in several respects. For example,
there are various provisions that are drafted with specific alternatives (i.e., Alternative A, Alternative B),
such as the rules on foreign tax claims.75 This format serves an agenda‐setting function of cabining the
perceived areas of legitimate differences of opinion and focuses dissent onto a few areas, rather than
suggesting clause‐by‐clause consideration of each provision was appropriate by a state weighing enact‐
ment. And as an empirical matter, for the most part, this hard tilt of the softish law has worked. Many
71

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(2)(d) (Am. Law Inst. 1987) (“A
court in the United States need not recognize a judgment of the court of a foreign state if . . . the cause of
action on which the judgment was based, or the judgment itself, is repugnant to the public policy of the
United States or of the State where recognition is sought . . . .”).
72
See MODEL LAW, supra note 6, art. 6; 11 U.S.C. § 1506.
73
See Pottow supra note 13, at 939.
74
See generally Charles W. Mooney Jr., Extraterritorial Impact of Choice-of-Law Rules for Non-United
States Debtors Under Revised UCC. Article 9 and a New Proposal for International Harmonization,
CROSS-BORDER SECURITY AND INSOLVENCY 202 (Michael Bridge & Robert Stevens eds., 2001) (praising this feature of model law).
75
See, e.g., MODEL LAW, supra note 6, art 13, note b.
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states that have enacted the Model Law have made only minor alterations at most to its text.76 More
importantly, the Model Law seems to be catching on. Leaving aside Europe, where its enactment rate is
respectable but less urgent given the overlay of the EU Insolvency Regulation, the Model Law has been
embraced by Canada, the United States, Mexico, Australia, Japan, and South Africa, to name just a few.
There are some conspicuous omissions (the South American uptake has been slow), but for the large
part, it is taking hold.77 The uniformity (i.e., minimal deviations) of the enacting states doubtless accel‐
erates this effect, as each successive country takes stock of how the law was deemed to be acceptable
to the one before.
The model law construct is not new and shows the success of pan‐governmental organizations, such as
UNCITRAL, in capitalizing upon a soft law approach to international law.78 While treaties are far from
foreign to UNCITRAL’s tool kit, it shepherded through the model law approach—radically softer than a
treaty—perhaps because it sensed the fragile negotiating environment on cross‐border insolvency. And
this model law in particular was substantively soft, likely further respectful of this environment. For ex‐
ample, the conspicuous omission of choice of law rules was another likely intentional stance.79 UN‐
CITRAL is especially well situated to gauge the level of comfort with member state delegations on ac‐
count of its working group format. These working groups are deeply consensus driven. Formal votes
are eschewed in lieu of a sometimes‐painstaking process that encourages cross‐delegate engagement.
(Coffee breaks are intentionally generous.)80 The idea of “stretching” or trying to cram down one ap‐
proach over the consternation of minority state delegations is just not how the operation works, and so
its legal product hides from firm pronouncements and frequently contents itself with generalized princi‐
ples or standards that leave some room for the eyes of the beholders. Here, too, the description of
“soft” law is apt: not just non‐binding but non‐specifying.81

76

See Pottow, supra note 13, at 986.
UNCITRAL maintains a list of the states that have enacted the model law, which now includes twentytwo states. See U. N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, STATUS: UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSSBORDER INSOLVENCY (1997)
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html (last visited Sept. 1,
2015).
78
Halliday & Block-Lieb, supra note 37, at 853-54.
79
See U.N. Comm’m. on Int’l Trade Law, Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Rep. of the Fourth International Insolvency Law Colloquium (Vienna, 16-18 December 2013), July 7-18, 2014, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/815 (May 2, 2014) (“[P]rocedural centralization leaves open the issue of which legal question
will be determined by the choice of forum (lex fori) and which will be left to the ordinary choice of law
principles (lex situs). The Model Law is silent on this question . . .”).
80
I have attended many group meetings, but nothing in the text above is telling tales out of school.
81
See generally Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Contracts and Private Law in the Emerging
Ecology of International Lawmaking, MAKING GLOBAL MARKETS WORK: CONTRACTS, PRICES AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY (Gregiore Mallard & Jerome Sgard, eds., forthcoming
2015) (on file with authors) (showing how UNCITRAL has evolved to stay relevant in a crowded international institutional sphere, with UNIDROIT and the Hague Convention nipping at its heels and copying
77
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D. More Soft(ish) Law: The EU Insolvency Regulation.

Worth a brief discussion in comparison with the UNCITRAL Model Law is the EU Insolvency Regulation.
The Regulation allows bankruptcy proceedings opened in one of the member states at the COMI of the
debtor to be recognized automatically in other member states, such as an “ancillary” jurisdiction where
cooperation by the COMI insolvency representative is sought.82 But the EU Regulation goes further than
the Model Law’s tentativeness on choice of law matters such as priority, distribution, and the like. The
Regulation provides a presumptive choice of law rule of COMI law (lex fori concursus). Under this pre‐
sumption, COMI state law applies extraterritorially to all cross‐border proceedings occurring within the
Union.83 That is, for a foreign main proceeding opened in the United Kingdom, UK bankruptcy law pre‐
sumptively governs the distribution of assets of the debtor located in France (including the British rules
of distribution). Needless to say, such a COMI‐centered choice of law regime is deeply universalist and
doesn’t seem that soft at all.
Nevertheless, territorialists persist in Europe as elsewhere, and so there are indeed territorialist re‐
trenchments, just as with the Model Law. Thus, although the Regulation is hard as a traditional matter
(binding Union‐wide, although Denmark did opt out originally),84 it remains “substantively soft,” follow‐
ing the lead of the UNCITRAL Model Law. First, the lex fori concursus rule is tempered by a laundry list
of “carveouts” from the choice of law presumption, ranging from laws governing labor agreements to
laws governing secured transactions.85 So, for example, if the COMI bankruptcy law treats employee
wages as general unsecured claims but an ancillary jurisdiction would give them a priority, the ancillary
jurisdiction may not need to follow the lex fori concursus’s ranking rule but can instead apply its own lex
secondus (actually, lex laboris) that elevates the labor claim’s rank.86 Given the breadth of these carve‐
outs, it is understandable that the Insolvency Regulation is rarely described as universalist but rather
“modified universalist” at best.87
A second retrenchment toward territorialism is the ability to open secondary proceedings. Much like
the veto local creditors hold under the Model Law to open parallel plenary proceedings under domestic
law in the face of a COMI foreign main proceeding, so too does the EU Regulation allow local creditors
(technically, any creditors) to open “secondary proceedings” under local insolvency law (per the above
its songbook). The enthusiastic embrace of the Model Law shows that UNCITRAL may have had the
exact right approach with going soft.
82
EU INSOLVENCY REGULATION, supra note 1, arts. 3, 19.
83
Id., art. 7.
84
See supra, note 32
85
See EU INSOLVENCY REGULATION, supra note 1, arts. 8-18.
86
See id., art. 13. Because the operative section of Article 3, paragraph 2, only explicitly refers to laws
“applicable to the contract of employment” and confers power on courts in ancillary proceedings to “terminate and modify” them, the example above is merely an expository illustration.
87
See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, ALI Principles, and the EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 8-9 (2002).
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example, a French insolvency proceeding after the UK‐COMI‐ed debtor’s main proceeding).88 These
secondary proceedings apply their own substantive bankruptcy laws of distribution and the like, further
muting the universalist inroads of the Regulation. (The Regulation also has a standard public policy “es‐
cape clause” mirroring the Model Law.)89
III.

ASSESSING THE ROLE OF SOFT LAW IN ADVANCING UNIVERSALISM.

The state of affairs of the cross‐border insolvency legal system as it now stands is thus “somewhat” uni‐
versalist—certainly dramatically more so than before the roll‐out of the Model Law and the EU Regula‐
tion. But there is a deliberately vague, inchoate nature to the state of the law (demonstrating the rub of
soft law). The parameters of the public policy carveout, the definition and application of “adequate pro‐
tection,” and so forth have been left unspecified, for courts and parties to hash out in litigation (or ren‐
der moot by settlement on the courthouse steps). This might be considered yet another aspect of
“softness” of the law. A key theme to the acceptability of the Model Law has been leaving difficult ques‐
tions unanswered to assuage passage. Leaving questions vaguely answered constitutes a friendly
amendment to that approach. (As discussed below, however, it is not without risk.)
A. Public Policy (Not) Gone Wild.
The success of this nascent regime has seen fits and starts but for the most part has been encouraging.
Two questions might be asked to test this encouragement: first, have cross‐border restructurings been
facilitated since the completion of these instruments; and second, have those restructurings evinced a
universalist bent? The first question is hard to answer empirically, but certainly on an anecdotal review
of headlines and war stories, the cooperation in multinational corporate insolvencies has been wide‐
spread and highly visible.90 The second question is closer, but signs nevertheless augur positively.
One useful metric for the second question whether the Model Law regime has allowed its incipient uni‐
versalism to take flight is to look at the usage of the public policy exception. Territorialists might opine
that in any case in which there is even a marginal difference of dividend based on substantive law (or
asset concentration) a local court will try to shoehorn a foreign request for assistance into the public
policy exception and deny assistance, thereby protecting the local players (and local turf).91 By contrast,
88

EU INSOLVENCY REGULATION, supra note 1, art. 34.
See id., art. 33.
90
The insolvency proceedings following the collapse of Lehman Brothers is a notable example. See Joseph Checkler, Lehman Australia Files Chapter 15 Bankruptcy Petition in US, WSJ BLOGS: DEAL
JOURNAL AUSTRALIA (Jan. 10, 2012, 4:40 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/dealjournalaustralia/2012/01/10/lehman-australia-files-chapter-15-bankruptcypetition-in-us/; Michael J. Fleming & Asana Sarkar, The Failure Resolution of Lehman Brothers, Fed.
Res. Econ. Pol’y Rev. Dec. 2014, at 175, 175 (“More than eighty jurisdictions’ insolvency laws applied to
the non-U.S. Lehman Brothers entities . . . .”).
91
Professor Buxbaum notes that a classification problem arises at the outset because insolvency regimes
reflect goals both public and private. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Rethinking International Insolvency: The
Neglected Role of Choice-of-Law Rules and Theory, 36 STAN. J. INT’L L. 23, 55 (2000) (“[T]he question
89
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universalists hope for restrained application of the public policy escape.92 Whose predictions have been
borne out?
Consider first the historical backdrop using the United States as an example. Before the Model Law,
comity was king, albeit semi‐codified in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code through former section 304.93 There,
U.S. bankruptcy courts were allowed to offer assistance to foreign proceedings on a discretionary basis
and pursuant to list of factors enumerated by statute.94 One of them, “distribution of assets substantial‐
ly in accordance with the provisions of this title,” presented a similar question.95
Would courts find any trivial deviation in distribution from U.S. law fatal, or would they take a more
permissive (perhaps “cosmopolitan”) approach? On its strictest read, any deviation from U.S. law would
preclude cooperation with a foreign representative, and so a universalist approach would be impossible
absent substantive convergence of bankruptcy laws, a fantasy not yet achieved but a topic for another
paper.96 Although there were some notable exceptions,97 U.S. courts for the most part were willing to
defer to foreign insolvency cases even when to do so resulted in differing creditor outcomes.98
Thus, the historical practice suggests a predisposition to take the universalist invitation of the Model
Law and run with it (at least in the United States). There might have been backlash, but the initial re‐
ports indicate that the public policy clause has not been a rule‐swallowing exception. Deployment has
been restrained. Sticking to the U.S. experience, we can look at an important exemplar, Mansfield. In a

arises whether it is possible to separate impairments of creditors’ interests that do not violate the public
policy of the United States from impairments that do.”). Others have decried the Qimonda and Vitro decisions as evidencing a trend of applying the public policy exception “merely to secure the interest of U.S.
creditors and interested entities.” Buckel, infra note 105 at 1284. For an extended discussion disaggregating the territorialist impulses of private local creditor distribution (greed) and sovereign public policy
vindication (pride), see John A.E. Pottow, Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The Problems of
and Proposed Solutions to ‘Local Interests,’ 104 MICH. L. REV. 1899 (2006).
92
MODEL LAW, supra note 6, Guide to Enactment and Interpretation, ¶ 21(e) (“[I]t is expected that the
public policy exception will be rarely used.”).
93
11 U.S.C. § 304 (repealed 2005).
94
The factors courts considered under § 304 included just treatment of all holders of claims; protection of
U.S. claim holders against the prejudice and inconvenience of foreign proceedings; prevention of fraudulent transfers; substantial accordance with U.S. bankruptcy distribution; comity; and opportunity for a
fresh start for the individual whom the foreign proceeding concerns. See § 304(c); cf. 11 U.S.C. 1507(b)
(preserving [many of] these considerations in gauging certain discretionary relief).
95
See 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4).
96
See LoPucki, supra note 23, at 2217.
97
See, e.g., In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001). Guided by the startling fact that the Bahamian administrators had devoured $8 million (USD) in fees on an estate of $10 million, the court denied deference to a Bahamian main proceeding under § 304(c)(4), on the appeal of a secured creditor founded solely
on differential payout. See id. at 159-61.
98
See, e.g., In re Bd. Dirs. Telecom Arg., S.A., 528 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2008). Here, the court upheld the
lower court’s recognition of an Argentinian proceeding under § 304, despite the creditor’s claim that Argentina’s insolvency regime lacked protections available to creditors under U.S. law. Id. at 176 n. 9.
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seminal case stemming from the market collapse of the commercial paper lending markets and a Cana‐
dian‐COMI‐ed restructuring proceeding under the CCAA, a Canadian representative tested U.S. willing‐
ness to allow departure from its own substantive bankruptcy laws in aid of enforcing a comprehensive
reorganization designed in Canada.99 There, the Canadian debtor secured multiple constituency buy‐in
for a plan, but because of the inter‐connectedness of the commercial paper market participants, a glob‐
al release was sought by non‐debtor, third‐party financiers not themselves in bankruptcy. The issue was
fully litigated in the Canadian courts (up through appeals) and eventually resolved in favor of the debt‐
or’s plan and the non‐debtors’ releases, finding sufficient flexibility in the substantive provisions of the
CCAA to permit the plan’s unusual terms of discharging non‐debtors from liability.100
When matters came down to New York for enforcement by injunctions of the releases against parties
with U.S. connections through chapter 15, objectors implored the U.S. court to find the third‐party re‐
leases violative of public policy. The court would have none of it. Expressly discussing the necessity of
comity and appreciation of foreign insolvency law and its differences, the court made clear that the
mere impermissibility of the non‐debtor releases under U.S. domestic bankruptcy law (actually a source
of some contention and circuit division)101 was not an impediment to the enforcement of the Canadian
orders as appropriate relief under the Model Law.102 Put another way, mere deviation from substantive
U.S. bankruptcy law—even with distributional consequences (profound ones—discharge, no less!)—did
not equate to a transgression of fundamental public policy worthy of triggering the escape clause. In
crafting its holding, the U.S. court underscored both the need for a procedural focus (remarking at how
the Canadian proceedings were cognate common law ones with full and fair trial and appellate proce‐
dure) and on the need to accept substantive differences of law in the international bankruptcy context
and the related need to cabin the public policy exception of section 1506 strictly.103
Mansfield is a representative U.S. case in terms of the strict construction of the public policy exception.
Contrary examples are few, but exist. For example, in the Toft case, the court found a violation of public
policy by a German insolvency representative’s request to get access to the debtor’s email, which may
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have triggered criminal liability in the United States.104 Toft was almost apologetic in its refusal to coop‐
erate with the German representative and shows how courts are striving for limiting principles, not
stretching for plausible grounds to dig in territorialist heels.105 That said, the U.S. record is not unblem‐
ished. In one much‐discussed U.S opinion, Qimonda, the trial court held that a German insolvency rep‐
resentative’s request to enforce an order rejecting executory intellectual property licenses (as licensor)
of U.S. licensees would violate fundamental public policy because the aggrieved licensees would only
have an ordinary claim for damages as opposed to the special quasi‐property remedy accorded under
section 365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (which effectively allows the licensees to “reject the rejec‐
tion” in part and continue exercising certain rights under the license).106 The opinion delved into con‐
gressional history and divined an intent to foster entrepreneurial activity through protection of intellec‐
tual property licensees, elevating such incentivizing to fundamental U.S. policy. The opinion was ridi‐
culed by most U.S. bankruptcy commentators as expanding the public policy exception to near‐comical
extent,107 and its reasoning (although not its ultimate holding of non‐cooperation) was abandoned on
appeal.108 All in all, it is fair to say the public policy exception has been interpreted narrowly in the Unit‐
ed States, vindicating the Model Law’s soft law potential to advance true deference to foreign insolven‐
cy laws by U.S. courts hosting ancillary proceedings. Harder law requiring cooperation was not neces‐
sary, and indeed could have proved destructive.
B. Beyond (and Avoiding) Public Policy: Adequate Protection with Restraint.
Going beyond the public policy question to other territorialist safeguards, the U.S. experience has been
similarly cooperative, for the most part restricting non‐relief to egregious cases and not, as territorialists
may have feared (or hoped), running wild with excuses to reject requests for relief.109 A good example
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to defer to foreign main proceedings within the intent of the Model Law and Chapter 15. Of the 253 cases that we found had reached a clear result, 237 resulted in recognition and only 12 in a denial of recognition.”); Leah Barteld, Cross-Border Bankruptcy and the Cooperative Solution, 9 BYU INT’L LAW &
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of the facts warranting non‐cooperation involves the Mexican reorganization (“concurso”) of Vitro,
S.A.B. de C.V.110 In Vitro, a Mexican‐COMI‐ed glass company sought to restructure its debt through a
Mexican consensual, super‐majoritarian voting regime analogous but far from identical to U.S. chapter
11. A group of dissident bondholders based in the United States voted no and launched numerous ob‐
jections in Mexico, screaming bloody murder. Faring poorly in Mexico, they waged a more successful
home court campaign in the United States, striving to convince the U.S. bankruptcy court in chapter 15
neither to recognize nor offer relief to the Mexican insolvency representative from the foreign main
proceeding. They lost on the first front—it was, after all a foreign main proceeding afoot in the debtor’s
COMI under the Model Law—and so the U.S. court recognized the proceeding and opened up a chapter
15 case.111 But when it came time to enforce the concurso (through injunctive relief to bind the U.S.
creditors and administer the U.S.‐based property), the U.S. bankruptcy court balked, siding with the
bondholders.112
Among the grounds argued to deny cooperation was, first, violation of fundamental policy. The section
1506 argument was launched on two general grounds: fundamental bankruptcy policy and fundamental
due process. The gist of the latter assault was that the Mexican system, at least in this specific case, was
crooked. Colorful facts about the questionable process used in the appointment of the insolvency rep‐
resentative and judicial ex parte procedures were all trotted out to disparage the result of the vote.113
The gist of the first attack was directed to the voting rules that enabled the concurso to pass the Mexi‐
can thresholds for acceptance in the first place. Specifically, the company had (allegedly) manufactured
inter‐corporate debt owing from the debtor to affiliates sufficient to make those affiliates dominate the
creditor vote and pass the plan. Worse, the corporate affiliates had guaranteed bondholder debt, and
the concurso sought to dissolve those guarantees (a development the affiliates enthusiastically support‐
ed in casting their dominating votes to approve the plan). All these attributes were on the heels of a
distribution proposal that offered equity around 50% of its stake while bypassing the creditors.
The Vitro U.S. bankruptcy court denied cooperation in light of these facts in finding a violation of bank‐
ruptcy policy.114 But, again, the pains the court underwent to constrain the scope of its grounds for non‐
cooperation were striking—they come off as genuine, not feigned. For example, it assiduously avoided
even engaging the corruption‐based challenges (doubtless in the service of international diplomacy) and
instead anchored its refusal to cooperate on the perversion of bankruptcy policy resulting from equity
holders stripping off guarantees on the premise of a “consensual” waiver of the absolute priority rule by

tion.”). I have not done my own recent study, but my intuition is that this cooperative trend is accelerating.
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affiliated insider‐creditors who were the obligors on the guarantees.115 Thus, while Vitro nominally
stands as an American example of non‐cooperation under the Model Law regime, its opinion is inten‐
tionally narrow and draws attention to the case’s specific and egregious facts (and even throws in some
platitudes about Mexican insolvency law generally).116 Indeed, on direct affirmance, the Court of Ap‐
peals downscaled the case even more, noting that the public policy clause did not even need to be
reached because whatever the definition of “adequate protection” of creditors requires, this surely was
not it.117
Vitro is an important U.S. precedent under chapter 15, not just in its holding but its analysis, because it
shows how rarely courts want to deny cooperation, and when they do, how they want to avoid suggest‐
ing another country’s bankruptcy laws violate public policy.118 The opinion is sensitive to distributional
differences and sensitive to cabining (or avoiding) the public policy out. Its facts were truly striking, and
for the most part it does not seem to have set the international community on edge about a U.S.
backslide toward parochial territorialism.119 Accordingly, Vitro is generally accepted and drew little of
the scorn reserved for Qimonda. And taking Vitro and the public policy cases collectively, the soft law
gamble of the Model Law (at least in the United States) seems to have paid off. By leaving wide latitude
for courts to cooperate, or not, it took a risk that the virtues of the universalist system would attract
states not to unravel the regime through territorialist interpretations and exploitations of the slack in
the system. That has happened, with universalist cooperation increasing.120
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fundamental standards of fairness and accords with the course of civilized jurisprudence.”). The scorecard is not perfect, of course. See Rubin v. Eurofinance SA, [2012] UKSC 46,¶ . 130 (refusing to enforce
a foreign avoidance action because such action “would be only to the detriment of United Kingdom businesses without any corresponding benefit.”). Id.

21
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3058883

C. Universalism Doctrine Strengthening: COMI Construction.
Developing alongside these heady delineations of the public policy exceptions to cooperation and the
giving of content to the adequate protection of creditors standard has been seemingly more workaday
but equally important precedent‐building on the doctrinal constructs that operationalize the Model
Law’s soft law regime. The easiest example of this is the COMI concept. Cases both under the EU Regu‐
lation and the Model Law have had occasion to weigh in on what “COMI” means, such as how and when
its presumption of registered office should be rebutted. The Bear Stearns case, for instance, established
that the Model Law’s presumption of registered office being the COMI is not a burden of persuasion
that if unchallenged by the litigants will ripen into a finding of fact. The opinion holds, on the contrary,
that a recognizing judge has an independent obligation (or at least prerogative) to assess the bona fides
of COMI and allow the court to deflate the presumption sua sponte in the instance of a true “letter box”
corporation that is officially registered in one jurisdiction but has no operational or other significance
there.121 Bear Stearns and its progeny put meat on the bones of COMI. EU Regulation cases have done
so too, such as the famous Parmalat case,122 which cross‐fertilize the Model Law jurisprudence due to
the same COMI standard and the injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 1508 to consider the foreign origins of
chapter 15. Ancillary doctrines are also being worked out in the case law, such as timing rules for de‐
termining COMI when there is COMI migration.123
D. Toward (But Not Yet) Distributional Universalism: Nortel.
The most dramatic recent deployment of the Model Law’s soft law regime has been with the sprawling
Nortel bankruptcy.124 Nortel Networks was a Canadian‐COMI‐ed telecommunications behemoth with
arms spread all around the globe, including a good chunk of assets and operations in the United States.
When the company collapsed, it had viable business lines and attractive IP portfolios. Under a strictly
territorialist system, it is deeply implausible this value could have been preserved as assets would be
carved up jurisdiction by jurisdiction at the behest of local creditors. Recognizing this, and using the
procedural tools offered by the Model Law in the various relevant jurisdictions, the stakeholders en‐
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tered into a comprehensive protocol to coordinate treatment of the debtor’s assets.125 To be clear, this
was not the archetypal universalist response. That is, they did not open a foreign main proceeding in
Canada and ancillary proceedings (e.g., chapter 15) in other jurisdictions to seek cooperation with that
Canadian COMI proceeding. This decision was likely for a couple reasons. First, the corporate group
network of Nortel contained individual corporate affiliates—and not just shells, but real, thickly capital‐
ized subsidiaries—that were COMI‐ed outside Canada.126 Thus, for example, Nortel’s U.S. subsidiary was
very likely COMI‐ed in the United States. Because the Model Law at present does not have rich tools for
dealing with corporate groups, it is not clear there was anything much better that could be done than
different proceedings in the different COMIs.127 The second reason is that there was likely too much
money at stake for non‐Canadian creditors to sign on up front to ancillary treatment when the COMI
issue was up for grabs.128 That said, the Nortel bankruptcy did deploy the procedural framework of the
Model Law to implement a worldwide approach to maximizing value of the assets: essentially an agree‐
ment to permit a worldwide sale of the assets irrespective of national borders. This was effected
through the execution of “protocols” signed by the insolvency representatives and debtors of the re‐
spective jurisdictions and ratified by courts conducting proceedings where necessary.129 The non‐
Canadian proceedings were thus “parallel” plenary proceedings.130
Critical to the success of the Nortel protocols was taking a page from the incrementalist, soft law hand‐
book of the Model Law. Specifically, the multinational agreement deferred resolving questions of allo‐
cation of the sale proceeds (i.e., the ever‐vexing distributional question), and instead focused on the
value‐maximization question, garnering consensus that the assets should be sold as going‐concerns
whenever possible. This plan worked with remarkable success: complete business lines were sold from
the Nortel estates, and a syndicate of suitors ended up buying the residual IP portfolio that remained
after the business line sales.131 Had the stakeholders insisted on hammering out an allocation rule of
which creditors would get which share of the proceeds up front, the contentiousness of that issue would
likely have doomed the cooperative impulses necessary to get the worldwide sale approach off the
ground.
Act II of the Nortel proceedings, however, was less glamorous. Under the terms of the protocols, the
stakeholders after sale were to mediate a mutually acceptable allocation of the sale proceeds to the lo‐
cal bankruptcy estates around the world. That mediation failed spectacularly. Legions of lawyers and
125
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experts tore through hundreds of millions of debtor assets in a mad squabble over who should get
what.132 Because the protocol planned for the worst, it instructed that if the stakeholders could not
agree in mediation, the matter would be litigated in all relevant courts, which is what came to pass, with
full‐blown trials. The soft law of the Model Law had nothing to say on distribution, and so Nortel ap‐
peared to demonstrate the best potential of the Model Law at the outset of the case but then the limi‐
tations of its softness as the mediation unraveled in Act II.
But that recast is too negative. In fact, even though the mediation failed and the Model Law had no fast
rule for allocating proceeds (universalist or otherwise), its procedural mechanisms helped coordinate
the disputed parallel proceedings, with the Canadian CCAA judge and U.S. chapter 11 judge conducting,
effectively, a “joint trial,” with simultaneous broadcasts and inter‐judge conferences. Indeed, the two
courts coordinated their decisions to be handed down at the same time.133 While the Model Law did
not force the issue of choice of law, it at least facilitated a mechanism by which two judges who had no
obligation to defer to one another could think and work together on judicial questions commended to
their own sovereign courtrooms. Lo and behold, they arrived “independently” at the same decision on
the merits of allocation (each venting with some chiding at the necessity for a litigated resolution).134
And moreover, that decision was to share the assets internationally, regardless of territorial location.135
The quasi‐paradoxical outcome of the Nortel case is thus fairly seen as yet another (partial) triumph for
universalism. For although the ability to launch parallel plenary proceedings was earlier described as a
territorialist concession to local creditors necessary to pass the Model Law,136 the outcome of the Nortel
“distribution” dispute lurched unabashedly universalist.137 What both the Canadian and American judg‐
es concluded, after hearing an onslaught of experts and parties testify on the appropriate way to carve
up the spoils, was that the assets should be presumptively shared on a worldwide pro rata basis—the
crux of universalism—albeit on an “estate by estate” basis.138 This solution can perhaps be seen as 2/3
universalist (evincing more incremental universalism). The foundation of the judges’ reasoning was that
132

See In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 532 B.R. at 550-51 (“The variance of the positions are of such magnitude that highly capable and responsible attorneys were unable, or in the heat of the fight were unwilling,
to find a middle ground despite three extensive and costly mediations.”).
133
See id. at 500.
134
See id. at 500 (“The Court can only speculate why the parties, all represented by the ablest of lawyers
and sparing no expense, were unable to reach a settlement on allocation.”).
135
See id. at 532; In re Nortel Networks, Corp., ¶258.
136
See Westbrook, supra note 55.
137
Quotation marks are used because technically ultimate distribution is left for each judge in his or her
own jurisdiction to administer, presumably, but not necessarily, under local bankruptcy priority rules.
This distinction might matter in instances of divergent priority rules. See In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 532
B.R. at 534 (“[T]he Court is not ordering a consolidated or coordinated global distribution . . . . Each
Estate will distribute as appropriate, through a plan process within the bounds of the applicable law.”).
For detailed discussion of the universalist consequences of this seemingly territorial aspect of the Nortel
case, see John A. E. Pottow, Two Cheers for Universalism: Nortel’s Nifty Novelty, in ANNUAL REVIEW
OF INSOLVENCY LAW 333(JANIS P. SARRA & BARBARA ROMAINE EDS., . 2015).
138
See In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 532 B.R. at 532-50.

24
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3058883

substance should dominate over form and that Nortel’s intellectual property assets were the result of an
interconnected worldwide research web of corporate affiliates. Therefore, although, for example, many
of the patents were held in a Canadian parent, that consolidation of title holding served purely logistical
purposes and it would be a neither fair nor sensible way to divide the gain to suggest the Canadian es‐
tate should get 100% of the IP sale proceeds. The courts emphasized, for example, that the intellectual
property accrued from research labs around the world.139 (The Canadians were not alone in their self‐
serving allocation proposal. So too did U.S. creditors argue that the proceeds should be allocated on the
basis of national proportionate revenue to the Nortel network, a metric that to nobody’s surprise
skewed strongly American.)140
Recall that universalism’s insistence on the application of one substantive corporate bankruptcy law
worldwide is premised on reducing credit costs. Its principal cost concern—that creditors should not
squander resources monitoring asset movement across borders (or hamstring debtors with cove‐
nants)—translates into a distributional proposition that creditors’ payouts from a multinational debtor
should not depend on the possibly random situation of assets in one country over another. Nortel’s re‐
pudiation of strict territorial location—rejecting nearly out of hand the formal situation of the IP assets
in Canada—is a telling embrace of universalism by judges forced to examine the pragmatics and function
of an actual modern cross‐border conglomerate. The U.S. court’s focus on actual creditor reliance as
opposed to presumed reliance based on formalism was revealed in comments noting that while credi‐
tors who had relied on distinct corporate entities could be protected, most likely knew they were deal‐
ing with one big beast.141 Those familiar with the American doctrine of substantive consolidation might
find this vector of analysis familiar.142 Interestingly, however, the U.S. court, mindful of governing appel‐
late precedent, tripped over itself to insist it was not effecting substantive consolidation. (This is why
the case was only 2/3 universalist.) Rather, the court said it was pooling the assets globally but then
dividing those assets pro rata (by claims allowed) into the respective national (territorial) bankruptcy
estates.143 So, as a simplified example assuming only two countries, if there were $X in claims lodged in
the U.S. proceeding and $2X in Canada, 2/3 of the proceeds would go to the Canadian creditors and 1/3
to the U.S. ones. In a world where creditors are sophisticated enough to file in either jurisdiction, how‐
ever, this essentially is universalism for purposes of asset allocation. But where there is a difference in
distributional rules, then the allocation does have contra‐universalist tension. For example, if a favored
class of creditors has priority under Canadian law, but not U.S. law, then they do better by having their
priority attach to 2/3 of the debtor’s assets. This is worse for the Canadian creditors than pure univer‐
salism, in which their Canadian priority would be exported to all the debtor’s assets worldwide, but bet‐
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ter than a situation in which assets physically within Canada constituted less than 2/3 of the worldwide
pot. Thus, the Nortel case can only be described as “mostly” universalist but not completely so. (Ac‐
cordingly, 2/3 seems like a helpful if arbitrary characterization.)
The “estate by estate” qualifier on the global sharing of assets was not the only holdback from full uni‐
versalism in Nortel. For example, the courts also carved out cash on hand from the global consolidation
and said each jurisdiction’s cash on hand would stay within its estate, a clearly territorialist outcome—
and somewhat odd given the findings of fact regarding interrelated cash management practices that
treated the conglomerate as one giant entity.144 Moreover, to defuse any concerns of substantive con‐
solidation, the courts held that inter‐corporate debt would be recognized as claims (and join the pro rata
distribution) as would cross‐corporate guarantees, outcomes that might not obtain under substantive
consolidation.145 On balance, however, the joint judicial opinions tilt unambiguously universalist, albeit
tentatively and incrementally so: worldwide sharing of assets and pro rata distribution of spoils, but still
ultimate allocation to territorial estates for distribution.
*

*

*

Taking all these case law data points together, culminating in Nortel, we can conclude that the Model
Law has been developing a rich precedent book to flesh out some of its (deliberately) unspecified areas
in a polycentric and non‐binding incrementalist fashion. This success has vindicated its soft law ap‐
proach. By allowing the content of the law to be worked out over time in a “jurisprudentially market‐
tested” manner rather than hammered out ex ante, the Model Law elided likely disagreements that
were surmountable over time. This approach capitalizes upon what learned experts have elsewhere
described as the “dynamic” nature of cross‐border insolvency law.146 The dynamic prediction is that the
resistance of territorially inclined states is not static but likely to erode over time. This is not just be‐
cause territorialist states are mistaken not to embrace the normative superiority of a universalist system
(some commentators have gone so far to cast territorialist states as “troglodytes”),147 and the passage of
time will allow them to see the errors of their ways, but because part of their resistance to universalism
is an unfounded risk aversion to the consequences of ceding some jurisdictional autonomy to foreign
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insolvency law.148 One Japanese commentator noting Japan’s historically territorial mood has evocative‐
ly described this territorialist characteristic as “fear.”149 Acclimation and repetition are both means by
which the reflexive fear of foreign law will dissipate. Thus, by skipping over some of the tough bits and
deferring to follow‐on explication through a developing casebook, the Model Law wisely allowed the
confrontations to be put off to a time when the fear index of universalism would be lowered.150 This
gambit paid off as seen by the increasing accommodation of foreign cooperation.151 The soft law ap‐
proach seems to have thus been a success for universalism.
IV.

THE RISK OF SOFTNESS AND UNIVERSALISM’S FUTURE: WHITHER THE NEW REFORMS?

The Nortel case is important in showing the ascent of universalism under the present regime. But it also
reveals what might be considered both the rosy and dark narratives that can flow therefrom. The happy
story is one of directional incrementalism: that through case‐by‐case development of the contours of
the Model Law regime, the system will be fleshed out to be increasingly universalist as time progresses.
The mechanisms of that advancement will be case law at first but ultimately amendments and revisions
to the underlying documents. (Indeed, the EU has just concluded its self‐mandated review of the Regu‐
lation and enacted amendments.)152 “Modified” universalism will relax its need to modify the universal
application of one substantive bankruptcy law and eventually give way to the enlightened world of full
universalism. That is the happy story.153
There is, however, another version of the future. The sadder version is that the reason the Model Law
was a compromise between universalism and territorialism is that there are certain bridges that sover‐
eignty‐conscious territorialist states will never cross, and full universalism is just untenable absent radi‐
cal changes in legal cultures and domestic insolvency laws. If that is so, there is no incrementalist path
at all—or at best, universalism will incrementally ascend the asymptote of Zeno but never arrive at its
148
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quixotic goal. On this view, future reform efforts will sputter if pushed toward further universalism,
much to the dismay of those seeking to reduce the costs of corporate credit. Even the past success of
the soft law approach—as mutual fund prospectuses counsel—is no assurance of future results.154
How are we to know which narrative is more likely? We might be able to gather some evidence on
which path is unfolding because we are in the midst of a new wave of reform on the first‐round regime
of the Model Law and EU Insolvency Regulation. That is, UNCITRAL is considering new model laws on
further insolvency‐related matters, some of which may be implemented by way of amendments to the
Model Law itself.155 And the EU Insolvency Regulation has undertaken a round of just‐enacted amend‐
ments (in the middle of 2015).156 Complementing these are other soft law efforts, most notably the
Global Principles joint project of the ALI and III,157 which includes a path‐breaking choice‐of‐law annex
that tackles some of the thorniest issues in cross‐border insolvency.158 Thus, to see the new directions
of cross‐border insolvency law—and whether the universalist promise of the soft law regime is being
realized—we must look at these reform efforts to see whether they are trending universalist or have hit
a territorialist stalling point.
The starting point with gauging the vector of these current reforms is to understand what is at play, i.e.,
what has been attracting clamor for change. Several clusters of insolvency law come to the fore. First,
widespread consensus, even by the most enthusiastic defenders of the Model Law, is that it provides no
clear guidance on what to do with corporate groups.159 How to deal with the insolvency of a multina‐
tional corporation’s often‐integrated web of corporate subsidiaries and affiliates, especially when those
affiliates if taken on standalone bases are COMI‐ed in different jurisdictions, remains a difficult puzzle.
Second, there is the oft‐avoided question of choice of law and its distributional consequences that
proved so intractable in Nortel.160 Third, there are the more mechanical issues, such as the previously
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discussed contours of the definition of COMI, that hunger for elaboration.161 Finally, there are the gen‐
eral communication and cooperation provisions that are purely procedural. Here, too, stakeholders
have pressed for more.162 Each of these “reform clusters” can be assessed in turn.
Taking the simplest first, the procedural provisions continue the march toward greater communication
between courts, which surely is consistent with the advance of universalism. (Greater communication
yields greater acclimation.) The EU Insolvency Regulation further encourages communications and in
some instances lands affirmative obligations on courts or insolvency representatives to communicate.163
Second, the mechanical definitions are being similarly refined to flesh out the COMI construct. For ex‐
ample, the Insolvency Regulation amendments take a stance on the timing issue for COMI migration and
formalize what had been the dominant test in case law (itself taken from a form of quasi‐official pream‐
ble text)164 that turns on creditor reliance and objective expectations of corporate seat.165 All this augurs
well for universalism and vindicates the incrementalist approach.
But this is the lowest hanging fruit. What of the distributional rub, namely, choice of law? UNCITRAL
has yet to touch it with a ten‐foot pole in its Model Law.166 The revisions to the EU Insolvency Regula‐
tion have also for the most part been underwhelming, although there has been some movement. The
revised instrument still recognizes the carveout‐based system but has now focused carveouts on the
“major” areas, such as labor law, secured credit rights, set‐off, and the like.167 Most tantalizing and can‐
did is a concession and aspiration in the amendments’ preamble stating that substantive bankruptcy law
remains too divergent and sensitive to roll out universalism at present and so the carveouts must re‐
main.168 It is paired with an expressed hope that the next time around when reconsideration is mandat‐
ed the carveouts might be ready for retirement.169
Other universalist inroads have been made in this current round of reform. For example, although too
technical for the scope of this chapter, there have been modifications to secondary proceedings, the
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territorialist veto entitlements under the Regulation.170 In brief terms, there are some universalist steps
forward and backward but mostly forward on secondary proceedings. Secondary proceedings can now
be used to support a corporate reorganization (not just liquidation),171 and a sort of jurisdictional hierar‐
chy is emerging whereby the insolvency representative of the secondary proceeding is partially behold‐
en to COMI court insolvency representative.172 Finally, the COMI court is now allowed to defer to the
substantive bankruptcy law (e.g., priority) of the secondary proceedings in crafting a plan in the main
proceeding.173 This final addition might sound like a step backward toward territorialism by elevating
the non‐COMI (lex secondus) bankruptcy law to receive even greater effect in the multi‐jurisdictional
proceeding than it currently receives, but that is misleading. The concession is made with the over‐
arching goal of reducing the incidence of secondary proceedings with their disruptive transaction costs
and parochial expressive costs.174 These secondary proceedings revisions, while not earth‐shattering, do
seem consonant with (and indeed incrementally advance) the universalist agenda. Moreover, as alluded
to briefly above, the even‐softer ALI/III Global Principles (softer because they are just academic recom‐
mendations and do not even have the governmental imprimatur of UNCITRAL) go further and suggest
reducing the number of carveout areas from lex fori concursus.175 They may well have an effect on fu‐
ture reforms.176
Finally, the corporate groups issue is being advanced more in the UNCITRAL domain than in the EU
amendments. There, UNCITRAL is presently wrestling with an addendum to the Model Law that would
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deal with “group solutions” to cross‐border defaults.177 While the project is still in formation, proposals
have been put forward by the UNCITRAL Secretariat to enable a “group representative” to design a
“group solution” for a corporate bankruptcy, and, importantly, to allow corporate subsidiaries to partic‐
ipate in the group solution without necessarily having to open individual insolvencies in their own COMI
jurisdictions.178 As mentioned, it is early days, so nobody knows yet where this might go. The relevant
point for this analysis of the soft law approach’s success is that where law is softest—UNCITRAL and
model laws—it seems to be tackling the most urgent and difficult subjects in cross‐border insolvency
reform. (On “the merits,” the proposals are universalist in ceding more jurisdictional autonomy to other
jurisdictions, here, the “group solution” court.) Incrementalism thus seems to have taken a foothold
and blazed a path which may well now prove dependency‐attracting. Specifically, crafting an interna‐
tional treaty on the treatment of corporate groups in cross‐border insolvency now appears to be a
methodological non‐starter. Rather, due to the success of the Model Law, the logical starting point is
building upon the soft law scaffolding already laid down by UNCITRAL.
In sum, the direction of current reforms seems to continue toward universalism, an important develop‐
ment for those who believe corporate insolvency law should strive to reduce credit costs. Those re‐
forms themselves have been incremental, and their vitality builds upon the success of prior efforts.
Transformative among these has been the UNCITRAL Model Law, with its deliberately soft(ish) law ap‐
proach, both methodologically of avoiding a comprehensive treaty, and substantively in terms of its in‐
complete resolution of all possible bankruptcy law issues. By recognizing the likely dynamic nature of
amenability toward cross‐border cooperation in insolvency law, the UNCITRAL approach has used dis‐
cretion as the better part of valor and led, perhaps somewhat serendipitously, to an ultimately more
universalist system than we might otherwise have ever dreamed were possible. And the current round
of reforms seems to be taking this potential and running with it (or at least walking with it). While uni‐
versalism remains modified, and its ultimate realization a long way off, the soft law approach continues
to reap success and move the ball further up the normatively desired field.
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